

# Decentralization outcomes in the context of Political Uncertainty in Zimbabwe: Co-management and CAMPFIRE

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## Organization of the Presentation

- Introduction
- Recent Political History of Zimbabwe
- CBNRM: Co-management and CAMPFIRE
- Assessment of social, institutional and ecological effects of political uncertainty
- Policy Implications/Conclusion

*" Forestry (**CAMPFIRE**) is not about trees (**animals**), it is about people. And it is about trees (**animals**) only as far as trees (**animals**) can serve the needs of people" Hobley 2005: 1 citing Westoby 1967.*

## Introduction

- Democratic Decentralization – seen as promoting sustainable resource management
- Co-management and CAMPFIRE viewed within that lens
- In Line with 'subsidiarity' principle
- Bottom – up approach

# Introduction

- Equity
- Efficiency
- Environmental Sustainability
- Positive contribution towards livelihoods – poverty reduction
- Stakeholder participation – increased representation
- Increased accountability and transparency
- More 'real' Powers (executive, legislative, judiciary) devolved – democratic decentralization





Figure 3: Location of the Co-management and Campfire case study sites in Zimbabwe  
a) CAMPFIRE study site (b) Co-management site

# Recent Political and Economic History of Zimbabwe

- 1980 – became independent
- Long struggle with land as the key motivation
- Early 1980s – economic growth and delivery of social services to the previously disadvantaged black people
- Economic liberalization – economic hardships
- DRC war, War veterans challenge
- Feb Constitutional 2000 referendum
- Fast track land reform – 2000 onwards
- Gatekeeper state – predatory rather than custodian

Figure 1: A simplified institutional organogram of co-management and CAMPFIRE



## Resource Management

- Pre-2000 (**co-management**)
- More forestry cover
- RMCs fairly active
- **Campfire**
- Better institutions for managing natural resources
- Better human-wildlife conflict management
- Post-2000 (**co-management**)
- Less forestry cover – forest 'invasion'
- RMCs largely inactive
- **Campfire**
- Weaker institutions- councillor (*jambanja/immigrants*)
- Reduction of human-wildlife conflict control mechanisms (ammunition)

## Integrity of the Protected Area

- Pre-2000: (**co-management**)
- Forestry fires controlled – contested 'science'
- 1980, 1985 settlers were evicted
- **Campfire**
- Gokwe has always been a frontier area – new settlers from parts of Zimbabwe
- Integrity of game corridor – though contested by livestock owners
- Post-2000: (**co-management**)
- Forest fire incidences increased – lack of resources and fuel
- New fields and settlements
- **Campfire**
- Increased grazing in the wildlife game corridor
- Game corridor fence destroyed

## Non-quota Use (Illegal Resource use)

- Pre-2000 (**co-management**)
- Dead wood collection monitored by Forestry Protection Unit and RMCs
- Poaching for the 'pot' not rampant
- **Campfire**
- Low levels of poaching – not threat to hunting quotas (900)
- Carcass ratio 3.9% (1999)
- Post-2000 (**co-management**)
- Difficult to monitor illegal collection of forest resources due to settlements in the forest reserve
- Poaching increased – some former RMC members are involved
- **Campfire**
- Poaching increased (800). grazing in the wildlife game corridor
- Carcass ratio 5.8% (2001)

## Financial Management and Benefits

Table 1: RMC Permit Revenue from Batanai and Chemwiro-Masawi RMCs

Year	Batanai RMC		Chemwiro-Masawi RMC	
	ZS	US\$	ZS	US\$
1996			3,059	306
1997	3,693	295	9,711	777
1998	6,543	263	3,531	142
1999	12,912	340	7,094	187
2000	4,000	89	6,641	149
2001	7,210	131	10,848	197
2002	8,776	159	3,430	971
2003	54,765	10	74,890	13
2004	356,000	57		

**Table 1: Nominal (Z\$) and real (US\$) revenue received by Nenyunga WMC from Gokwe North RDC between 1991 and 2004 (source WWF Database).**

Year	Revenue (Z\$)	Revenue (US\$) based on the parallel market rates
1991	Z\$31, 365	US\$8,360
1992	Z\$31, 000	US\$8,908
1993	Z\$45, 536	US\$13,064
1994	Z\$85,000	US\$10,167
1995	Z\$78, 850	US\$8,910
1996	Z\$205, 010	US\$19,488
1997	Z\$166,000	US\$6,640
1998	Z\$44, 688	US\$1,902
1999	Z\$176, 627	US\$4,612
2000	Z\$148, 907	US\$2,127
2001	Z\$92, 000	US\$271
2002	Z\$571 000	US\$381
2003	Z\$700 000	US\$117
2004	Z\$10,651,000	US\$1,238

parallel exchange rates from John Robertson Economists ([www.economic.co.zw](http://www.economic.co.zw)) and The Independent Newspaper ([www.theindependent.co.zw](http://www.theindependent.co.zw))

## Financial Accountability

- Pre-2000 (co-management)
- Financial accountability a major issue even before 2000 – audits every October
- Basic accounting courses and naming and shaming
- (Lord Nolan’ Standards in Public Life)
- CAMPFIRE
- Support from CCG
- Financial statements on walls of shopping centre
- Less political manipulations
- Post-2000 (co-management)
- Informal ‘loan’ system – limited or no auditing
- High inflation levels
- CAMPFIRE
- Limited oversight from CCG
- Financial statements no longer made public
- Increased ‘Politics’ (force committee militias) - councillor

## Conclusion

- Increase the direct incentives from sustainable resource management to local communities – link costs and benefits
- Give local communities greater powers (not burdens or symbolic gestures) to deal with problem animals and related local issues
- Re-assess the balance between livestock (crop farming) and wildlife
- Create mechanisms to add value to both wildlife and forestry resources (global commons – think globally act locally, CC, fugitive power?)
- Increase donor support to the areas of local community representation and accountability within existing institutions

## Conclusion

- *“When we are hungry, the elephant is food. When we are full, the elephant is beautiful”*

*Amasignare; Siyabonga, Merci, Thank You*